Abstract-With the rapid development of android smart terminals, android applications are exhibiting explosive growth. However, there remains a challenging issue facing android system, a malicious application may broadcast user's private information. In this paper, we propose a Naive Bayesian-based approach for analyzing private information leakage under the android broadcast mechanism, which calls BRbysA. Firstly, broadcast actions registered in manifest.xml are picked up statically by keyword matching technique. Secondly, with the Xposed framework, the broadcast actions specified at run time are discovered by hooking broadcast callback onReceive() function. Combining the above two ways, we can capture all real-time broadcast actions in an android application. Thirdly, we adopt Naive Bayesian learning algorithm, all broadcast actions which involved in users' privacy leakage are analyzed and classified. Finally, we evaluate the proposed approach by using the dataset from Drebin and Google Play.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays more attention has been paid to individual privacy information protection in android platform [1] . There are different security capabilities in android custom ROM [2] . It leads to the potential loopholes and vulnerabilities in android system [3] . For example, a loophole in BlackPhone has been discovered to allow an attacker to decrypt users' encrypted information [4] . There has occurred a new malware through Google Play Store to inject malicious codes for collecting the user's bank and credit card information [5] . Consequently, it is of great importance to underpin trusted android market by malicious applications analysis approach, which can accurately and efficiently detect APKs that reveal users' private information.
Existing methods are mainly divided into two categories: static detection and dynamic monitoring. Static detection methods involve in the analysis of signature information and permission information. However it is difficult to find the privacy disclosure from android broadcast mechanism by analyzing permission information. Dynamic detection methods like MonkeyRunner and HIPS can achieve malicious behavior detection with higher detection accuracy, but it also suffer from low code coverage and longtime consumption. In fact, android system may broadcast users' private information [6] . If a malicious program can accept system broadcast, it can obtain users' private information by calling onReceive() method.
To solve these problems, this paper proposes a Naive Bayesian-based approach called BRbysA for analyzing private information leakage under the android broadcast mechanism. Firstly, broadcast actions registered in the manifest.xml are picked up statically by exploiting keyword matching technique. Secondly, referencing Xposed framework, the broadcast actions specified at running time are discovered by hooking broadcast callback onReceive() function. Combining the above two ways, we can capture all real-time broadcast actions in an android application. Thirdly, adopting Naive Bayesian-based learning algorithm, all broadcast actions involved in users' privacy leakage are analyzed and classified. To our knowledge, we are the first one to introduce the machine learning-based method to analyze android broadcast receiver. Furthermore, based on the above analysis, the probability of each broadcast actions appeared in malicious programs is calculated to determine whether the application discloses users' private information Based on Drebin dataset proposed by Daniel et al [7] and Google Play application set, we have test the effectiveness of the proposed method successfully. We summed up several kinds of broadcast actions that really exist the risk of leaking users' private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents related work. Section III gives the problem description. Section IV introduces the proposed method in detail. Section V presents our experimental results. Section VI concludes this paper and shows some possible future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In the aspect of android malware detection, there are two schemes: static detection and dynamic monitoring. Static detection methods [8] mainly concern the analysis of signature information, permission information of APKs. Dynamic DOI reference number: 10.18293/SEKE2018-208 detection methods [9] , [10] , [11] can trigger the malicious behavior of malicious programs by running android applications. Common dynamic testing tools include Monkey, MonkeyRunner, TaintDroid, droidBox and so on [12] .
Most of current malicious applications detection researches focus on the analysis of permissions and malicious APIs. There was a little work on investigating android broadcast mechanism. Fadi Mohsen et al. [6] have developed a tool broadcastViewer, which can be used to view android system broadcast actions that has been installed on your phone. However, the work detects broadcast actions only from the perspective of static analysis and cannot detect the behavior of broadcast receiver when the actual operations are triggered by the application. In addition, Erika Chin et al. [13] proposed ComDroid to analyze android inter-process communication risk. Di Tian et al. [14] analyzed the characteristics of Broadcast Receiver vulnerability and developed a broadcast receiver vulnerability detection system called BRVD. Noam Kogan et al. [15] present an anti-pirate revocation scheme for broadcast encryption systems. The above three work have mentioned that broadcast message may be with user's private information in broadcast transmission and interapplication communication. But they also didn't analyze all broadcast actions systematically. It may lead to miss some broadcast actions that reveal users' private information.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Users download a wide variety of APKs from third-party application market in order to meet their daily commerce and communication needs [16] . An android system consists of four components: BroadcastReceiver, Activity, Service, and Content provider. BroadcastReceiver is used to receive broadcast declared in Manifest.xml file. At this time, BroadcastReceiver also can call its onReceive() method to perform certain operations. Interaction between BroadcastReceiver and android system is shown in Fig. 1 . The broadcast information may contain users' private information. A malicious program can perform android broadcast callback function by customizing onReceive() method. For example, if a malicious program has registered SMS BroadcastReceiver, it can receive SMS messages and access the information through intent.getExtras() method. In this paper, our objective is to provide a sound method for detecting and analyzing malicious android APKs, which use broadcast to steal user privacy.
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Broadcast Receiver issue system broadcast notification regiser system broadcast Monitor system broadcast occur specific system events receive system broadcast, callback onReceive() method Figure 1 . Interaction between broadcast receiver and android system IV. DESIGN OF BRBYSA As shown in Fig.2 , the BRbysA method is divided into three parts: broadcast action static collection, broadcast action dynamic discover and Naive Bayesian-based privacy leakage analysis. It must combine static and dynamic methods to collect broadcast action, because the existing dynamic technologies do not monitor all broadcast actions in the APK's manifest.xml. Moreover, exploiting Naive Bayesian-based learning algorithm, we can determine whether there exist the risk of leaking users' privacy through broadcast action information in an APK. 
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A. Statically collecting broadcast action
In general, self-defined BroadcastReceiver is specified by receiver label. A particular broadcast action can be specified by intent-filter label and received by BroadcastReceiver. In BRbysA, broadcast actions in APK's manifest.xml file are collected using keyword matching algorithm in Table I . Extract the manifest.xml file of APK into a specific directory. 3.
Read the manifest.xml using FileReader and BufferdReader. 4.
Split the manifest.xml across blank, store elements into String array.
5.
Create broadcast actions set, to compare with String array while ( bufferdReader.readLine() != null) { String[] words = line.split(" "); for (String word : words) { if (word.equals("SMS_RECEIVED")) {arrayList.add("SMS_RECEIVED")} } } 6.
If the broadcast action equals the array element, then add it to the result set. End.
B. Dynamically discovering broadcast action
To obtain broadcast actions specified at run time, this paper proposes a hook-based dynamic monitoring scheme to observe the actual state of broadcast callback onReceive() method. The hook operation for broadcast registration API is carried out based on Xposed framework. BRbysA states the XposedInstaller entrance class in the configuration file assets/xposed_init. The algorithm is shown in Table II . 
C. Naive Bayesian-based privacy leakage analysis
Based on the above methods, all real-time broadcast actions can be captured in an APK. Next, a naive Bayesian machine learning algorithm is introduced to classify broadcast actions. Let X0 be normal program, X1 be malicious program, Ci represents broadcast action bai appearing in an APK, then the formula P(Ci|Xi) = P(Xi |Ci) * P(Ci)/P(Xi) (1) indicates the occurrence probability of broadcast action bai when the APK is normal or malicious. The algorithm is shown in Table III . ArraySingle is used to store the occurrence number of unreplicated broadcast action . The initial elements of ArraySingle are set all '0'. 3． For any broadcast action bai, count the number of malicious APKs from ActionArrays under the premise of bai occurrence, which is denoted by Ni1, count the total number of all APKs from ArraySingle under the premise of bai occurrence, which is denoted by Ni2. Calculate P(X1|Ci) through Ni1 divided by N i2. 4． For any APK, calculate P(X1), the probability that APK is malicious.
5． For any broadcast action bai, count the number of bai in ArraySingle
Ni3; Count the total number of all broadcast action in ActionArrays Ni4. Calculate P(Ci) through Ni3 divided by Ni4. 6． For any broadcast action bai, calculate P(Ci|X1) by Formula (1). 7． For different broadcast actions in an APK, count the average value of P(Ci|X1) and find a suitable threshold. Determine whether an APK will reveal user private information by judging if the above average value exceeds the selected threshold or not. End.
V. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
A. Experiment environment
We have implemented and deployed BRbysA on Android version 4.4. The total kinds of broadcast actions is 136. The Xposed Framework version used in BRbysA is No.54. We randomly choose 1000 regular APKs from the Google Play and download 1000 malicious APKs from Drebin dataset as experimental samples.
B. Static collection and dynamic discovery effectiveness
Using the algorithms in Table I and II, we have counted the number of all broadcast actions in the 2000 APKs. Due to limited space, here we only release statistic data. As shown in Table IV , only 31 in 136 kinds of broadcast actions appears in the 2000 APKs, the others don't appear. PA represents the average value of conditional probability for broadcast actions occurring under the premise of malicious APK. The result shows that the first five have higher frequency than 0.3. 
C. Malicious APKs detection accuracy
Next, we use the above samples to test malicious APK detection accuracy of BRbysA. As shown in Fig. 3 , the horizontal axis represents probability value ranges, the vertical axis represents the number of APKs that PA falls in a certain probability value range. In the experiment, 0.3 is selected as a threshold. As shown in Fig. 3 , the number of APKs whose PA is greater than 0.3 is 123+141 + 26 = 290. That means, 290 malicious APKs can be detected by BRbysA. Meanwhile, the number of APKs registered broadcast actions in 1000 malicious APKs is counted as 310. Considering the most extreme situation, all malicious APKs registered broadcast actions exist the risk of leaking users' private information. Thus the malicious APKs detection rate of BRbysA is 290/310=93.548%. The result shows that BRbysA can achieve good malicious APKs detection. Finally, we compare BRbysA with Manilyzer [17] . In the experiment, we randomly select 100 APKs from the above 310 malicious APKs registered broadcast actions and select 100 APKs from the above 1000 regular APKs. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes BRbysA to analyze private information leakage under android broadcast mechanism. The highlights of this paper are as follows. Firstly, combining static collection and dynamic discovery, all real-time broadcast actions in an APK can be captured. Secondly, adopting Naive Bayesian learning algorithm, all broadcast actions involved in users' privacy leakage can be analyzed and classified. Finally, we have evaluated BRbysA using the dataset from Drebin and Google Play, which illustrate there are several kinds of broadcast actions that really exist the risk of leaking users' private information.
However, the problem of threshold selection is not covered in this paper. With the change of sample size, we have found that different thresholds may make different decisions. This is desirable to develop some data mining approaches to increase the malware detection accuracy in the set of more malwares. Furthermore, our ongoing research will test the time and load overhead performance of the proposed approach. 
